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Reclaiming Story in Organization: Narratologies and Action Sciences

David M. Boje, Rossana C. Alvarez and Bruce Schooling

According to TwoTrees (1997), stories have three properties: time, place and mind. We believe that many narratologies currently being applied in the field of organizational analysis and the social sciences more broadly marginalize these three properties. In effect, narratology marginalizes *story*. In what follows, we will critically review common narratologies and suggest some ways in which the idea of story can be returned to analysis.

Stories, TwoTrees suggests, have:

1 A *time*: 'You tell stories at a certain time of the year, a season, or time of the day. There are Fall and Spring stories.'
2 A *place*: 'You recount stories at this place, and places have their own story.'
3 A *mind*: 'Every creation, even a story, has a life of its own. We create a story and it has a life. The stories have origins. You must tell a story with permission.'

For TwoTrees, stories must be re-contextualized back to their time, place and mind. The stories live and there are penalties for getting a story wrong or telling it without permission. 'What is the Lakota penalty for changing a story, telling a story wrong or without permission?' David Boje asked at a presentation by TwoTrees. 'It is death', she replied (TwoTrees, 1997). Why death? 'Because, the story in an oral culture is the entire living history of the community' (TwoTrees, 1997). Stories live, unless we kill them. Watch as each of the narratologies we will discuss kills off story. She also told Boje to watch it when he used the word 'we'. This brings us to consider what 'we' are doing.

Toelken (1996), a folklorist who questions the style of Eurocentric folklore narrative scholarship that fits stories into neat typologies and collections, said:

> A couple of years ago at the American Folklore Society Annual Meetings I gave a paper in which I detailed why I no longer felt I could discuss Navajo coyote

> stories in depth; a singer – a medicine man – told me that either I or a member of my family would pay for it with our lives. (Toelken, 1996: 52)

His academic colleagues had two reactions. One was agreeing with the decision. Another was to tell him 'it was anti-intellectual to quit and that it was [his] duty to the folklore profession to go as deep into the field as [he] could and share the results'. He 'was surprised by how many in both of these camps soon began inviting [him] to their campuses to talk about Navajo stories some more' (Toelken, 1996: 53). For the Navajo, stories are living embodiments of reality, living dramas, a language that creates reality, not the reverse (Toelken, 1996: 53). Telling 'Native stories for non-Natives out of context may be dangerous to our mental health: for we know there will always be a discrepancy between what the story *is* – as a living articulation – and what you and I think it *means* as an example of something-or-other' (Toelken, 1996: 56). We think, however, that stories *live* in both modern and postmodern culture, not just in indigenous culture.

In this chapter, we explore three concerns about reclaiming story from narratologies that do not possess an epistemology or ontology of the living story. First is Culler's (1981: 169) observation of a hierarchy and indeterminacy between narratology and storytelling that can be deconstructed. Second is the duality of narrative and story as exhibited in the structuralist traditions of the Russian Formalists, American structuralism and French Structuralists. Hereafter, we refer to this as the formalistic approach to narrative.[1] Third is Culler's (1981: 169) observation that if any of 'these theorists agree on anything it is this: that the theory of narrative requires a distinction between what I shall call "story" – a sequence of actions or events, conceived as independent of their manifestation in discourse – and what I shall call "discourse", the discursive presentation or narration of events'. We think the work of Clair (1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997) on narrative and story in organizations and nations allows us to resituate the narrative/story duality. We will raise three issues in our resituation.

First is the issue of how to reclaim story from the varied narratologies in organization theory (OT). Narratologies are boundless and wonderfully varying. Our short list of narratologies, in contrast to living story, ranges from realist to formalistic, social constructionist, post-structuralist, critical theory and postmodern narratologies. (See Table 7.1 for contrast of methods, epistemology and ontology.) Narratologies are the characters in the story we are about to tell you. It becomes the work of the realist narratology to tell true stories; of structuralist narratology to sort out good and bad stories by their form; social constructionist narratology to look retrospectively for sense making of stories; post-structuralist narratology to erase the differences between story and materiality (those who think that they mean 'it's all text' will disagree); critical theory to put story back into its material condition, and postmodern narratology to shatter Grand narrative into many fragments called *petit histoires*, or just local stories.

Second, in Part II of this chapter we explore the application side of storytelling theory, and how various approaches to practice are rooted in the various narratologies. We review four cases in which storytelling is applied to consultation. We contend that 'restorying' the lived stories (White and Epston,

1990) is a different action science from Cooperrider and Srivastva's (1987) 'appreciative inquiry', Hopewell's (1987) approach to re-narrating congregation narratives and F. Emery (1993, 1997) and M. Emery's (1997, 1998) 'Search Conference' environmental scan and history sessions. We think each use of storytelling relies upon quite different epistemologies and ontologies of narratology.

Restorying, for example, is rooted in deconstruction, approaching action with a post-structuralist narratology, while appreciative inquiry acknowledges its action roots in social constructionist narratology (Gergen's 1991, 1994 and Weick's 1979, 1995 work). Search Conference and re-narrating congregations are both more in line with the pragmatist epistemology of Peirce (1940) and Pepper's (1942) contextualism. The Emerys explicitly situate their environmental scan and history session in contextualism (Pepper, 1942) and pragmatism (Peirce, 1940), while Hopewell (1987) focuses on the formalist aspects of Pepper's model. We try to avoid pronouncing one better than another: they simply combine different epistemological and ontological assumptions in their narratologies.

Third, in Part III of the chapter we have something to say about interdisciplinary approaches that, to us, span three or more narratological positions. We will contrast four narrative studies of organization. First, Czarniawska's (1997a) *Narrating the Organization* (spanning pragmatism, formalistic scene-act ratio typologies and the dramaturgy of social construction). Second is the *Storytelling Organization Theory* of Boje (1991a, 1995b; Boje et al., 1999), Boyce (1995) and Kaye (1996) that spans post-structuralist, folkloric, social constructionist and postmodern positions. Third, is the *narrative-organization equivalency* work of James Taylor and his colleagues where communicating, including narrating, is equivalent to acts of organizing. Finally we look at Clair's (1993, 1994, 1996, 1997) work which embeds *multiple nested narrative genres* (i.e. historical narratives, ancestral narratives, personal narratives and contemporary narratives). The three interdisciplinary approaches in Part III of the chapter differ in complex and significant ways from the Part II single discipline approaches. In order to explore these differences (and similarities) we must first review our short list of narratologies and the associated applied work. This we do in Part I.

We will briefly summarize the claims of each narratology against the other to show their different extensions into applied story theories in organizational consultation. We intend this as a self-reflexive inquiry – whilst somewhat ironically telling you a narrative and laying out a chronology, as if we as narrator-authors had nothing to do with selecting and ordering the various narratologies (Czarniawska, 1997b; Hatch, 1996; Weick, 1995). We explicitly caution the reader, then, that the narratives we are about to tell are fictions. We have made up and invented a narrative of narratological history, with our own reading of plots and characterizations. Our narrating continues as we map four action science approaches (Appreciative Inquiry, Restorying, Narrating Congregations and Search Conferences) and four highly eclectic interdisciplinary approaches (Narrating Organizations, Storytelling Organization Theory, Equivalency and Nested Narratives) to narrating/storying

organization among the various narratologies. We begin with Part I, a typology of narratologies.

Part I: Contrasting alternative narratologies in organization studies

Realist narratology: In realist narratology people and organizational stories are treated as dead objects without exploring lived context. Realist narratology mimics the positivistic and Cartesian scientistic rhetoric of operationalization, and causality, to collect stories as though they were so many mirrors of reality (Rorty, 1980). Events are strung together into chronologies to vibrate with realness. Story becomes the in-place-metering device to measure culture or some other construct. Story becomes a transparent mirror of an objective realism with little or no empirical attention to the behavioural performance context in which stories were socially enacted or to their embedded situation within situated political and economic discourses. Realism stories mimic naturalism by supplying rich narrative details, scientific facts and figures, references and chronology to authenticate their performance as non-dead and non-fiction. The focus is on interpreting the story as an organizational artifact, an object-text in laboratory, biography and interview studies.

In laboratory research, the experimenter varies the content of the object-story to assess outcomes such as memory and believability (Martin and Powers, 1979; Martin et al., 1979, 1980). For example, Martin and Meyerson (1988) reify stories-as-objects when they identified stories as mere 'its'. To reify means to ignore or forget the socially constructed context of the story and then to apprehend it as an object. It is as if stories are both mere cultural artifacts and cultural measuring devices without exploring stories performed in place and time. An example of the text-as-object paradigm for story research would also be the early work by Martin et al. (1983). Their study contrasted how markedly similar story texts, abstracted from organizational histories and CEO biographies manifested themselves in different types of organizations without examining how the stories were used or whose voice was privileged in their telling. Mumby's (1987) power and politics analysis of Martin et al.'s (1983) IBM story was a re-reading from a more critical narratology. Clark's (1972) accounts of organizational uniqueness were also texts without *in situ* story-behaviours, but with rich historical context. Lombardo's (1986), and McCall et al.'s (1989) interviews with 86 executives as they recalled and retold stories provided interesting life-history work, but did not afford a behavioural analysis of *in situ* performance or historical context. In this early work, Wilkins (1979) asked storytellers to recount their stories while raters scored the re-enacted story on a set of response scales. Siehl and Martin's (1982) survey of sales trainee knowledge of four stories measured recall, but once again, not performance. Finally, McConkie and Boss (1986) report how one story, the 'Firing of Elayne', was mentioned by 85 per cent of their interviewees. While these analyses are astute, rigorous and provocative, we do not learn much about the natural behaviour context in which stories are performed, or the organizational implications of such performances.

Most of these object-story researchers have moved on to less realist narratologies. Martin's (1990) more recent work, for example, deconstructs the story of a pregnancy in economic, gender and racial contexts. (See also Martin and Knopoff's (1997) deconstruction of gender). Wilkins and Thompson (1991) have also moved to a more situated and polyvocal (many-voiced) storytelling inquiry.

National and organization narratives reduce many stories to a totalized, universalized and unitary realism narrative. In Nazi Germany, Bosnia, and now Albania, 'positivist histories were marshaled to the causes of ethnic cleansing and genocide' (Currie, 1998: 92). Hitler commissioned totalized histories, as did the Serbs. But so did the US commission histories of Columbus, which were full of narrative exclusion of the indigenous, imposing strange linear plots of manifest destiny to tell its story of slavery and the American Holocaust. Bhabha (1989: 297) puts it this way: 'The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a national culture, while the very act of narrative performance interpolates a growing circle of national subjects'. Indeed most historians until recently have done this, but with the post-colonial and postmodern challenges to unitary and linear histories, more minority voices are being included. Also building upon the pragmatist traditions of Peirce (abduction, for example), the Italian microstorians (for example Muir (1991); Ginzburg (1980); Levi (1992) and others writing in the *Quaderni Storici* journal) also call into question Grand narratives of macrohistory, particularly elite Great-man histories by collecting 'little people' microstories (Boje, 2001 in press). Great-man and Great company histories are popular in basic texts of organization theory and management in the US. Microstoria includes both quantitative and qualitative focus upon systematic archival analysis from property registries, notary records, ecclesiastical archives, trial proceedings, pamphlets, etc. Microstorians insist that they are dealing with real subject matter that can be analyzed pragmatically and empirically to ascertain a 'right meaning' (Boje, 2001).

Finally, consultant stories are oftentimes realist tales, taken out of their *in situ* context with other stories in a series of interviews, or whistle stop story-collection tours, to be summed and aggregated together and used in another context (a book or tape), as if stories in this new context meant the same thing. The microstorians object to aggregating stories since it presents an overly harmonious and integrated understanding of context. Aggregating stories strips them of their (performance and historical) context, a common practice in guru texts written for managerial consumption (e.g. Hammer and Champy, 1993; Peters and Waterman, 1982) or made into a realist tale with all the supportive charts, letters and tables of a Harvard case. Textbooks import hundreds of realist tales to authenticate the practicality of OT and management theory. Harvard and other case reports rely upon second and third-hand accounts of stories, typically told from management's or social science points of view (as in the ones we assemble now).

In sum, we, along with Fineman and Gabriel (1994) and Kaye (1996) argue that organizational behaviour (OB) textbooks, with their recipe of palatable and incontestable definitions of organizational concepts and stylized case reports,

are treated as 'real', while stories from the working folks are treated as 'unreliable', 'unscientific', 'unreal' and in the final analysis, 'mythical'. We obviously think myth making is an essential part of organization change (Boje et al., 1982). Other narratologies we shall explore, such as postmodern, post-structuralist and microstoria (pragmatist) seek to see through the synthesizing, aggregated, utopian-progress, allegory of objective, Cartesian-reality, or what Tyler (1986: 132) refers to as moving beyond the 'totalized story of stories'.

Formalist narratologies: Formalist traditions for Culler (1981) include Russian Formalists, American structuralism and French Structuralists. Formalists did a narrative turn away from realism narratology but replaced it with an appreciation for forms that were more real than the narratives. Fisher's (1984, 1987) narrative paradigm theory, Burke's (1945) dramatistic method, sociolinguistics, semiotics and other formalisms we have no space to mention, are colonizing story work in OT. As we said at the outset, narrating is the death of storytelling; narrative dominates story; narrative is plot and coherence, while story is a mere element in narrative plot theory (e.g. Burkean narrative theory).

For Saussure story is a signifier (a system of signs) that is disconnected from what it represents or signifies. In this narratology, time, place and mind do not matter, only form counts. Saussure argued 'that the ability of narrative to refer to something other than itself was an illusion' (Currie, 1998: 35). Formalist narratology rests on three radical claims: (1) that the sign (story) and the signified (context) have separated in some arbitrary ways; (2) a deductive analysis transparently reveals the *form* of narrative *is* its content; and (3) the narrator uses framing devices to make narratives appear real but they are just signs.

Fisher's (1984, 1987) narrative paradigm theory seems to argue that humans as 'storytelling animals' construct 'good reasons' for believing and acting upon some stories, while rejecting others. The reasons for accepting or rejecting a story come from logical and value-based reasoning (Fisher, 1984). Key concepts in narrative paradigm theory are a narrative's 'probability' and 'fidelity' (Fisher, 1987: 5). Narrative probability is the observer's evaluation of a story's coherence; 'does it hang together?' Narrative probability addresses a story's credibility by analyzing internal consistency, missing elements and the consistency of character behaviour given what the observers know of the storyteller or character in similar stories. Probability is what juror's assess given the accompanying testimony of the defendant and those who know the defendant. Fidelity analyzes the truthfulness of a story – 'does it ring true to other stories of the same type?' – 'Does it pass the jury's tests of rational and value laden reasons?'

Burke (1945) has various topological models to describe basic narrative structures, such as agent, purpose, scene, agency and act in his formalistic theory of 'scene-act ratios'. Czarniawska (1977a: 32) applies Burke's 'dramatistic' model to Swedish public administration. For example she argues that 'according to Burke's dramatistic method, people assume a dialectical stand in face of paradoxes, in order to achieve the dissolution of the paradox-

Table 7.1: Metaphysics of Selected Alternative Narratologies

Narratology	Organization studies	Ontology	Epistemology	Methodology
Living story	TwoTrees (1997) Toelken (1996) Clair (1993, 1997)	Stories live and possess time, place and mind.	Knowledge is the story performed in time, place and has a life of its own (mind). Story can not be dualized from context without imbalance and other consequences.	Restory the relation between dominant narrative and authors' preferred story.
Realist Peters and Waterman (1982) Hammer and Champy (1993) Harvard cases	Early Martin lab. and uniqueness studies Wilkins (1979) Lombardo (1986) McCall et al. (1989)	'Real' reality mirrored more or less imperfectly in narrative or case. Narrative is a cultural artifact and object. Social facts.	Dualist: real is real, narrative is subjective interpretative knowledge; story is an object to know other objects (culture, etc.); managerialist; strategic.	Experimental manipulation; interview with narrative as measures; narrate with rating scales; biography of narrative uniqueness.
Formalist Barthes (early) Ricoeur Levi-Strauss Propp Shklovsky Fisher; Frye de Saussure H. White	Czarniawska (1997 in use of Burke's scene–act ratio); Ford and Ford (1995 in use of speech act theory).	'Real' is unknowable, but some forms are pragmatic or possess fidelity and probability, or scenes, plots, act, agency, purpose.	Narrative is sign system separated from knowledge of the signified. Narrative is rhetorical device. Contextualist epistemology of historical event unfolding in the present.	Collect and contrast forms of narrative and coherence of narrative elements.
Pragmatist Peirce and Pepper; Microstoria work e.g. Ginzburg, Muir, Levi.	Emery's Search Conference; Hopewell's congregation studies.	Assertion of the reality of general terms or laws. Meaning is oriented toward the future.	Ideas not mere abstractions; they are essences – things are what they are. Names are intended to show the nature of things. 'Any sort of fact is easily real for a contextualist' (Pepper, 1942: 143).	History session by the actors. Learning from the past in view of future action.
Social con-structionist Berger and Luckmann Geertz Blumer/Mead Denzin Weick Gergen	Boyce (1995) Czarniawska (1997 applying Blumer and Weick). Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987)	Individual and socially constructed realities.	Narrative is subjective account reified as objective knowledge. Narratives are acts of sensemaking.	Explore relative differences in narrative social construction.

Table 7.1 (cont.)

Post-structuralist Derrida DeMan Culler Fairclough Foucault (archaeology) White and Epston	Mumby (1987) Martin (1990) Kilduff (1993) Boje (1995a) Martin and Knopoff (1997)	There is no 'outside' to the 'inside' of the text to warrant meaning; duality or originary narrative.	Narratives are intertextual to knowledge of other narratives; narratives are ideological with political consequence.	Deconstructive reading of narratives.
Critical theorist Marx Marcuse Horkheimer Adorno Debord (in situationist movement)	Alvesson and Willmott (1996); Mills and Simmons (1996); Fulop and Linstead (1999)	Historical materialism (even dialectical teleology) shaped by class, ethnicity, gender and socio-economic values.	Grand narratives dominate local knowledge. But there can be local resistance to grand knowledge narratives.	Hegemonic reading of narratives; ideology readings of narratives.
Postmodernist Best and Kellner (on Debord) Baudrillard Lyotard Jameson Deleuze and Guattari	Burrell (1988); Clegg (1990); Hassard and Parker (1993); Boje (1995a) Harju (1999); Boje et al. (1996); Bergquist (1993); Hatch (1996); Burrell (1997)	Virtual and cultural hyper-real, sceptic critiques of late capitalism, to affirmation of spiritual world.	Knowledge and power are narratively fragmented; to affirmative knowledge living cosmos.	Polyphonic and juxtaposed readings and writing of a chorus of narratives.

induced drama' (Czarniawska, 1997a: 167). The function of dramatistic approaches to narrative is to look at rhetorical devices by which the author controls the position of the listener in relation to the narrative forms (i.e. agent, purpose, scene, agency and act). We will expand on this below.

Austin (1962) proposes the performative of speech acts, such as naming an act (i.e. 'I declare you man and wife') or promising to act ('I will marry you') as utterances that can change conditions. Ford and Ford (1995) examined how speech act performative is related to organizational change. Managers who can distinguish four types of conversation: initiative, understanding, performance and closure are thought to be more effective. 'Change is created, sustained and managed in and by communications' (Ford and Ford, 1995: 560). When someone speaks a story, for example, he or she is taking an action by asserting claims from experience, expressing preferences for the future and initiating changes. The effectiveness of these 'deeds of change' depends upon what was said, how it was said, when it was said and the impact it had (Ford and Ford, 1995: 545, 561). In short, many narrative approaches put form ahead of living story.

Pragmatist narratology: Pragmatism analyzes narrative in context to ascertain principles for meaningful communication. 'Pragmatics highlights the discrepancies between what is said and what is meant, and examines how people work out what is meant' (Fairhurst and Putnam, 1999: 4). The semiotic

theory of Peirce (1940) is different from the formalist paradigms of speech-act, scene-act, narrative fidelity, etc. We mention in Table 7.1 the Italian Microstoria School that applies Peirce's abduction theory to trace stories and people in their embedded social networks. Logical deduction seeks to verify *a priori* formal theory (e.g. Fisher's narrative paradigm theory), while induction or grounded theory focuses on generating theory from *in situ* observations (e.g. speech-acts in ethnographic studies or Geertz's thick description of Balinese Cock Fighting). Microstorians such as Ginzburg (1980), Muir (1991) and Levi (1992) are quite adamant in applying Peirce's abduction theory that they are not interested in deconstruction, formalistic or postmodern narratologies. The hazard in both deduction and induction is 'exampling' stories by just collecting grounded stories to confirm and fit into the analyst's logically deduced theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 5). The middle ground that Glaser and Strauss (1967) call 'constant comparative analysis' is similar but not identical to what Peirce terms 'abduction.'

Microstorians focus on the recovering of forgotten and marginalized history through both quantitative and qualitative study. The analysis focuses upon identifying names of places and people in ways that allow microstories to be told. Microstoria is sensitive to the micropolitics of power, the middle ground between local and Grand narrative, and treats historical material as real. At the same time the interpretative inquiry is based in abduction to interrogate the gap, contradictions and disjuncture between what was said and what was recorded, and between the preconceptions of elites and exotic characters.

Two applications we will explore in Part II are the impact of Peirce, through Pepper's (1942) work, on the storytelling work of Fred and Merrelyn Emery in storied aspects of their Search Conference approach and in Hopewell's (1987) narrative studies of church congregations.

Both Ricoeur (1984: 165) and White (1973: 13–21, 353) have wrestled with Pepper's world hypotheses (see Table 7.2) because of the puzzle that it presents to their narrative theses. White (1973: 13–21) in *Metahistory* has borrowed Pepper's typology to classify leading historians of the nineteenth century stating 'history is not a science or is at best a protoscience with specifically determinable nonscientific elements in its constitution.' We have also listed the historians identified by White in Table 7.2 along with exemplars listed by Pepper. Indeed, argues Ricoeur (1984: 165), historians narrate in so many ways, White's call for a typology of narrative forms seems reasonable.

Pepper's (1942) *World Hypotheses* introduces a typology in an attempt to organize all facts about knowledge within coherent systems, world hypotheses. According to Pepper, a world hypothesis is distinct from the restricted hypothesis characteristic of the special sciences in the sense that, if adequate, it shows the connection of theory with common sense. Pepper's major concern is to reconcile or to find a 'common root' between the perceptual (sense) and the conceptual (thought) poles of knowledge. In doing so, he addresses the 'tension between common sense and expert knowledge ... the interior dynamics of the knowledge situation' (1942: 44). Pepper identifies a limited set of 'root metaphor theories' or 'world hypotheses' that are robust enough (as adequate in precision and scope) to provide a relatively adequate interpretation of the full

scope of the world's facts. These world hypotheses are formism, mechanism, contextualism and organicism. Each has a root metaphor. For example, the root metaphor of mechanism is the machine and emphasizes the discovery of empirical facts and their part to whole relationships in closed systems. Organicism develops the root metaphor of an organism emphasizing its developmental processes. Formism is the root metaphor of similarity that allows the correspondence of forms in ideal type contrasts. Contextualism, our main focus here, employs the root metaphor of the historical event in the present.

Table 7.2: Four world hypotheses of Stephen Pepper

Dimensions	**Analytical Theories**	**Synthetic Theories**
Dispersive theories	Formism 1 Root Metaphor: Similarity 2 Explanation: Order and function are real; disorder and dysfunction unreal or exceptions. 3 Exemplars: Plato, Aristotle 4 Categories: • Immanent Formism – Theories of ideal types and classifications • Transcendent Formism – Blueprint growth models; ideal plans. 5 Truth Theory: Correspondence – mirror theory from metaphor to reality.	Contextualism 1 Root Metaphor: Historic event in the present. 2 Explanation: Only horizontal theory; focus on change and novelty in the unfolding immediate event. 3 Exemplars: Pragmatists like Peirce, James, Bergson, Dewey and Mead 4 Categories: • Quality (spread, change and fusion) • Texture (strands, contexts, referents). 5 Truth Theory: Operationalism – verifiable hypotheses and working theories.
Integrative theories	Mechanism 1 Root Metaphor: Machine 2 Explanation: Elements are parts in a mechanistic, spacio-temporal framework. 3 Exemplars: Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Berkeley and Reichonbach. 4 Categories: • Configuration of parts. • Lawfully ordered. 5 Truth Theory: Causal adjustment – abstract general terms and formulae.	Organicism 1 Root Metaphor: Integration 2 Explanation: Historic events are steps in organic process toward ideal progress (thesis-antithesis-synthesis of Hegel). 3 Exemplars: Hegel, Schelling, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce. 4 Categories: Fragments result in nexuses, leading to contradictions, and an organic whole 5 Truth Theory: Coherence – each level of integration resolves contradictions of the levels below.

Pepper's (1942) typology excludes 'explanation by ideology' that White (1973) according to Ricoeur (1984: 165) 'puts in the fifth rank of narrative structures' by including 'an ethical stance inherent in a particular manner of writing history.' White, says Ricoeur, reintroduces a post-Marxist, Frankfurt School concept of ideology, and Habermas and Gramsci and Althusser, to make the case of 'history's tie to action in the world of the present', since 'history orders events and processes in narrative' (Ricoeur, 1984: 165, fn. 58).

White (1973) turns to Frederick Nietzsche to extend Pepper's typology. In writing about legal systems and punishment, Nietzsche (1956/1887: 209) argues:

> Yet the criterion of purpose is the last that should ever be applied to a study of legal evolution. There is no set of maxims more important for an historian than this: that the actual causes of a thing's origin and its eventual uses, the manner of its incorporation into a system of purposes, are worlds apart; that everything that exists, no matter what its origin, is periodically reinterpreted by those in power in terms of fresh intentions; that all processes in the organic world are processes of outstripping and overcoming, and that, in turn, all outstripping and overcoming means reinterpretation, rearrangement, in the course of which the earlier meaning and purpose are necessarily either obscured or lost.

In these few sentences, according to White (1973: 363), Nietzsche rejects 'the Mechanistic, Organicist and Contextualist conceptions of historical explanation, at one and the same time'. But note that White has excluded the formalist world hypothesis. White is seeking to include ideology. White, says Ricoeur (1984: 165) 'submits ideology to the same rule of discussion that applies to the mode of explanation by formal arguments'. Ricoeur (1984: 164) notes that White thereby sets up a hierarchy (duality) of narrative structure (plot types) and formal argumentation over ideology. Ricoeur (1984:167) charges that White constructs typologies of plot, argument-style, ideology and world hypotheses to classify historiographical style. In the end White forms a complex, three-dimensional formalist typology of ideologies, plot types and Pepper's typology.

Boje and Luhman (1999) argue that each of these world hypotheses have provided a way to narrate organizations with metaphoric 'images of organizations' since the mechanical apparatus of Hobbes' Leviathan and Newton's mechanistic science in the seventeenth century. The world, society, human body and mind were seen as machines within machines that could be controlled and scripted by human knowledge. Machine metaphors have been popular in OT since the industrial revolution. Each technology becomes a discourse to read and fashion organizations, from Frederick Taylor's scientific management to more recent machine models of TQM and reengineering. Formalist (ideal type typologies centred on bureaucracy) images of organization have been the icons of formal Weberian readings of organization theory. Fayol (1916: 70) based his fourteen commandment-principles of management and his five basic managerial functions on an organic metaphor of the firm (the living tree). Contingency theory sought to appropriate mechanistic and organic into yet another formalism.

Native stories, we believe, need not be considered animistic. But for Pepper's (1942: 120–1) project, native stories of the life of stories, animals, the living planet and cosmos are not considered to be adequate for science. 'Animism, as a metaphysical hypothesis, is the theory that takes common-sense man, the human being, the person, as its primitive root metaphor' (1942: 120). 'It is characteristic of animism that we can never precisely capture spirit in conceptual terms and list a set of categories that will stand firm' (Pepper, 1942: 121). Pepper (1942: 122) uses the example of lightning:

> It is a Great Spirit clanging his arms. It is the roar of the lightning bolts hurled by a Great Spirit. It may even be a spirit itself roaring in pursuit of some other spirit to devour. These interpretations are all consonant with the categories of spirit,

> and there is nothing but the limitations of poetic fancy to put a stop to such interpretations.

Pepper objects to the metaphysics and dogmatism of spiritualism and animism. Contextualism has two applications to organization studies and intervention work. In Part II of this chapter, we will offer two examples of how Pepper's work is applied to organization studies.

Pragmatism has other applications to other narratologies. For example, Zanetti (1998: 279) argues that 'critical theory' is 'infused with American pragmatism and linguistic philosophy' and 'has become increasingly domesticated and utopian at the same time'. Of the critical theorists, Habermas, in particular (see below), envisions a utopian speech community brought about by following specific speech procedures.

Social constructionist narratology ranges from interpretativist, constructionist and social constructionist paradigms with many different theories within each (Schwandt, 1994). To Weick (1995), and most of the storytelling work in organization studies, storytelling is an act of sensemaking without any presumption of a material condition. People tell stories and make sense of their reality. For Berger and Luckmann (1967) reality is socially constructed as subjectivities become treated as if they are objectifications, and people reify the conversion forgetting that the objectifications were actually constructed in and through social interaction. Schwandt (1994) does an excellent review of the variegated terrain of social construction theory; we narrate only briefly and superficially. Interpretivist schools vary from Geertz's (1973) interpretative Anthropology, Blumer's (1968) Symbolic Interactionism, and Denzin's (1992) Reformed Interpretative Interactionism. Constructivists range from work by Nelson Goodman (1984), Von Glaserfeld (1989) (radical constructionism), Kenneth (and Mary) Gergen's social construction work and Guba and Lincoln's constructivist paradigm. Our point is that different narrative studies can say they are doing 'social construction' but be doing very different traditions. Since we do not intend to linger here, we will direct you to Schwandt's (1994) work and summarize the challenges to social construction that apply to narratology.

We will contrast approaches that apply social construction differently in the next two sections. Here, we will mention that Mary Boyce's (1995) work on storytelling organization theory is based on Gergen's approach to social construction, as is part of Czarniawska's (1997a) Narrating Organization approach.

Post-structuralist narratology: Post-structuralist narratologists saw the form-fixation of formalistics as an unnecessary reduction to complexity, heterogeneity and slippage of narrative meaning. Post-structuralists problematize the 'mimetic transparency' of realism narratology by denying any defensible difference between fiction and the real (Currie, 1998: 63–4). For example, DeMan posed problems for Saussurean structuralism by distinguishing between the referential beyond a text, and the autotelic within a text (Currie, 1988: 44). Along similar lines, Derrida in *Of Grammatology* also challenges Saussure about the supposition of the inside and outside of text.

Only particular social construction narratologies look reflexively at the privileging of status, gender, race and other cultural baggage in the narrative construction and reading process (Stanfield, 1994: 180–1). Others do not address power. Few structuralist linguists put the sign into the historical context of a given utterance's social production. In the formalistic approaches we reviewed, the historical dimension of synchronic structures (or processes) was generally just disregarded, so that spatial relations or differences in ideal types could be highlighted.

Derrida's (1978, 1981, 1985) deconstruction is not a method with steps and procedures, it is more of an inductive epistemological practice. Derrida's (1978) concept of *différance* put temporal meaning back into the analysis of structural relations. In terms of story, the story (form) elements are always in motion. Derrida's non-metaphysical theory of time resisted both 'history in general and the general concept of history' (Currie, 1998: 79). Resisting history in general resists, for example, Marx's preference for a Hegelian dialectic model of linear history, by arguing that this is no one single history, but many differentiated histories (Derrida, 1981: 58).

We can also question the common idea of a 'founding story' in organization studies. Derrida calls into question an 'origin' or any 'first moment in an historical sequence' of stories (Currie, 1998: 82). This would include the mythical first moment when the demand to recite a story that has yet to be articulated is met with a story performance. An alternative view is that there are multiple stories told from many views.

There is also a point of confusion about inside/outside text, we wish to briefly comment on. 'Il n'y a pas de-hors-texte' is Derrida's most misinterpreted slogan. 'The slogan' says Currie (1998: 45) 'does not mean there is nothing outside the text as most commentators have taken it. It is closer to "There is no outside-text"'. We assume then, from this narratology, if narrative is a text, then there is no outside narrative because outside of a text is more text. Language, says Currie (1998: 90) '*is* a material practice not only in the sense that it is to be understood in isolation from the mind as the material marks of writing but also in the sense that textual and linguistic constructs are (to use a word that Derrida avoids) *reified* or transformed into material things and practices in the world'. Standing 'outside' the organizational text to read it is impossible (Currie, 1998: 47). It is impossible for two reasons: (1) intertextuality, and (2) outside-text is another text. Intertextuality 'posits a model of referentiality which cannot distinguish between reference to the world and reference to another text, since textuality is woven into all' (Currie, 1998: 70). For narratives, it means narratives refer to other narratives, and we can not distinguish the world from just another narrative. As we shall explore various narratologies vehemently reject these assumptions of no origin and no outside of text.

There is some middle ground. Our reading is that Derrida deconstructs the duality of mind and things by resituating text in its material forms, including its technical, political and ideological practices as well as bombs, factories, wars and revolutions (Currie, 1998: 90). This does not mean those factories, wars and

revolutions are mere texts or just narratives. Derrida's problematic is a refusal to dichotomize between material and narrative.

In search of a middle ground, therefore, we assume organization is a material and a discursive formation. Its materiality comes into being through discourse, established in a multiplicity of stories and transformed by more stories. Stories are meaningful in their embeddedness in the webs of stories. Others may deconstruct and then resituate the mind/materiality duality differently. In deconstruction, it is up to each practitioner to script their own moves, and this we have done. There are other viable readings, such as a feminist deconstruction of story (Martin, 1990) or a rereading of March and Simon's or Weber's classic works (Kilduff, 1993; Martin and Knopoff, 1997) and deconstructive readings of organization research (Kilduff and Mehra, 1997). Martin's (1990) study for example approaches deconstructionist readings of a CEO story from multiple positions, constructing new storylines by changing the gender of the main character.

Discourses can be deconstructed to reveal masked pluralities, hegemonic rhetoric and inconsistencies. By discourse, we mean the expressed knowledge/power nexus that promulgates a cohesive social practice.[2] Discourse is also the infinite play of differences in meaning mediated through socially constructed hegemonic practices (Boje, 1995a: 998). The discursive metaphors (play, text, conversation) can be empowering as Thatchenkery (1992: 231) argues because they provide 'organizational participants considerable flexibility to create their own interpretation of what is going on.' At the same time, even discursive metaphors, selected for their polyvocal flexibility, can still be sites for panoptic discipline (Foucault, 1979: 217).

Critical theory narratology: Critical theory like pragmatist narratology is less willing to bracket the material condition from acts of narration than is social construction or realist narratology. Yet unlike pragmatists, critical theorists favour macrohistorical narratives of class struggle and technological development. Karl Marx narrated with critical attention to the material conditions of labour practice and at one point foresaw the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, although in his later writings he saw that the revolution was not to be. Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and the Frankfurt School in particular revised his work in the mid-twentieth century.

Marx called the factory the 'House of Terror' (1867/1967, *Capital*, Volume 1, hereafter C1: 277). His narratives are rich with metaphor. 'The capitalized blood of children' and women feeds global political economy to this very day (C1: 757). As Marx puts it 'the vampire will not lose its hold [on him] so long as there is a muscle, a nerve, a drop of blood to be exploited' (C1: 302). In industrial capitalism, 'the small and nimble fingers of little children' and young ladies are in constant demand to feed 'the "vampire" of global capitalism' (C1: 757–8). Marx's narrative of the labour process described skilled industrial workers as once attending lectures on trigonometry, engineering and physics to learn more knowledge about their craft. Were they not the ideal knowledge workers? Yet work them till they drop and work them again until they die of exhaustion seemed to be the governing principle of their managers.

The objective here is to maximize the level of exertion that is put forth in production and service, to deny any sunlight or leisure, to exhaust labour to death:

> It usurps the time for growth, development and healthy maintenance of the body. It steals the time required for the consumption of fresh air and sunlight. It higgles over a meal-time, incorporating it where possible with the process of production itself, so that food is given to the labourer as to a mere means of production, as coal is supplied to the boiler, grease and oil to the machinery. It reduces the sound sleep needed for the restoration, reparation, refreshment of the bodily powers to just so many hours of torpor as the revival of an organism, absolutely exhausted, renders essential. (C1: 265)

> Mary Anne Walkley had died from long hours of work in an over-crowded workroom, and a too small and badly-ventilated bedroom. (C1: 255)

Capital, says Marx, 'cares nothing for the length of life of labour-power' (C1: 265). Once a peasant is removed from land tenure or entrepreneurial ventures (e.g. cottage industry, small shop ownership) the labour power must be sold. 'It quenches only in a slight degree the vampire thirst for the living blood of labour. To appropriate labour during all the 24 hours of the day is, therefore, the inherent tendency of capitalist production' (C1: 256–7).

Determinist theories read history through a retrospective lens of capitalist concepts. This is done in order to make the case that markets, technology and even history evolves and unfolds the teleology of the capitalist project. History is seen as unfolding in stages, as various civilizations get more advanced and progressive in their application of markets, technology and the natural evolution of the survival of the rich over the poor. The critical position is that there is no teleology, a political economy can evolve or it can devolve depending upon the situation.

For example Horkheimer turned from the revolutionary potential for the working class to an appeal to 'critical intellectuals' (Zanetti, 1998: 282). What we mean by a critical theory narratology ranges from Marx's macrohistorical narratives, Marcuse's call to move beyond one-dimensional narratives of systemic modernism (i.e. Taylorism, social engineering and what we now call managerialist control), to Habermas' preference for speech communities that can exhibit consensus based upon agreed language rules.

Habermas has given his own reading to critical theory, influenced by the pragmatics of speech communities and his hope for reasoned consensus (Zanetti, 1997, 1998). 'Habermas shifts the focus of critical theory from *agents* of change to *procedures* of change' (Zanetti, 1998: 279). Those working more in the Frankfurt School tradition, still see the potential for agents of change. Alvesson and Willmott (1996) and Fulop and Linstead (1999) have written critical readings of management, and Mills and Simmons (1995) have a critical reading of OT. Each gives much support to Braverman's neo-Marxist (1974) book, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* and calls into question managerialist narratives in the hope that emancipation from the hierarchy of managerialist and social engineering control is possible. 'Integral to the emancipatory intent of Critical Theory is a vision of a qualitatively different form of management: one

that is more democratically accountable to those whose lives are affected in so many ways by management decisions' (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996: 40). It is hoped that alternative forms of work will allow communications that 'are progressively less distorted' than those of 'socially oppressive, asymmetrical relations of power' (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996: 18). They also (1996: 12, 13) question the ideology of individualism in managerialist writing, challenging empowerment writing as yet another discourse of control, and critique the relentless expansion of globalizing capitalism without attending also to its more destructive social and ecological aspects. Critical theorists contend that cooperatives and collective-self-determination systems pose more democratic options to hierarchical firms. Mills and Simmons (1995) look at Braverman's deskilling but deviating from a strictly class-based approach, ask why the managerialist discourse of OT excludes race and gender from its pages. They also see managerialist narrative as apologetics for greater control of work by management (1995: 68–9). Fulop and Linstead (1999: 63), for example, point out that Braverman can be used to show that Mayo and Taylor are linked in various ways. Each of these texts deconstructs managerialist narratives and substitutes neo-Marxist narratives of liberation. The potential of critical narratology is to analyze people's microstories in relationship to grand, macro-story contexts: a worker after a downsizing episode, the plight of temporary workers, or the toxic conditions of new sweatshops accumulating in Asia – in contrast to the mechanistic myth of ultimate perfectibility or global progress.

A critical narratology perspective is being applied to studies of Nike's spin on its claims in codes of conduct (Boje, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999). I want to include the critical narratology work (my term) of O'Connor (1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2001 in press). O'Connor has been doing a resituation of Taylor, Mayo, Follett and other foundational management and organization authorities by researching the political, economic, social and autobiographical narratives. Her work traces Mayo's relationship with the Harvard Business School, putting it in political and economic context. This work combines narrative and organization study, as will as rehistoricizing these personalities.

Postmodern narratology: (Francese, 1997; Lyotard, 1997; Currie, 1998; Dixon, 1998) resituates structuralist, social constructionist and critical theory narratology. Like critical theory and post-structuralist narratology, postmodern narrative theories situate power and politics in narrative, but this time within the cultural milieu of late capitalism (Dixon, 1998).

Postmodernism is a contested discourse. Some posit a break with modernity, while others focus on an epistemological critique of culture. Francese (1997) sees the postmodern condition as something to withdraw from with the help of several late modern narrative writers. There are also quite radical positions such as Baudrillard's hyper-reality (it's all simulacra), and Lyotard's death wish to Grand narratives, and critical postmodern positions such as Jameson (postmodern culture situated in late capitalism) and Debord's Marxist critique of the consumption and production spectacle (Best and Kellner, 1997).

In search of a middle ground, we will argue that Grand narratives are not dead and have not been replaced by fragmented local stories. Rather the two are

intertwined and contesting in ways that have important organization implications we explore in Part III. There is also a middle ground between sceptical and affirmative positions.

In postmodern management and organization writing the more sceptical positions have been reviewed with an eye to exclude any affirmative postmodernists. At the other extreme some affirmative writing ignores the dark side of the postmodern condition, which ends up creating another progress myth or replacing one totalizing account with another. The sceptics are sensitive to this danger. Sceptics include Alvesson and Deetz, 1996; Hassard and Parker, 1993; Kilduff and Mehra, 1997; Parker, 1997; Schwartz, 1994; Thompson, 1993. Sceptics argue that postmodernism is nihilistic and that the postmodern condition has decidedly negative effects on identity, community and ecology. Affirmatives posit a paradigm shift from modern to postmodern. Affirmatives would include Bergquist, 1993; Boje and Dennehy, 1993, Boje et al., 1996; Clegg, 1990 and Hatch, 1997. Some affirmatives consider management and organization from a postmodern epistemological perspective such as in the writings of Burrell and Cooper in *Organization Studies* beginning in 1988, as well as the work of Linstead and others. Other affirmatives look at postmodern organizational forms (e.g. Bergquist, 1993) that exhibit chaos and complexity patterns or are post-Fordist (e.g. Boje and Dennehy, 1993; Clegg, 1990) or are potentially more ecological (Boje et al., 1996; Hatch, 1997). Many sceptics call into question the very idea of a postmodern organization or a cultural epoch that is postmodern or see postmodern organization as a new cultural artifact. So-called 'postmodern organization' 'affirmative' and 'episodic' writing is given dismissive replies:

1 'Nonsense' (Thompson, 1993: 188)
2 'A distraction from rigorous analysis' (Parker, 1993: 212)
3 Unreflective 'in regard to cultural elitism and modern conditions of power' if it does not include critical theory (Parker, 1993: 211)
4 'Little is to be gained by ... talking about postmodern organizations' (Alvesson and Deetz, 1996: 192)
5 Merely 'relabeling' so-called organic, adhocratic or post-Fordist organizations as postmodern (Alvesson and Deetz, 1996: 192)
6 'McPostmodern' (Parker, 1997)
7 The work of 'self-declared organizational postmodernists' (Kilduff and Mehra, 1997: 454, footnote 1)

The point we are making that relates to narrative is that there are narratives of a postmodern organization and postmodern condition, just as there are quite sceptical narratives of nihilism and exploitation. We think the point is to look at their interrelationship in organization studies. Hassard (1993), for example, calls for middle range theories between epoch and epistemological positions, pointing to Ken Gergen's work as a primary example. In a recent review, Alvesson and Deetz (1996) called for critical theory and postmodern theory to work together in ways that could combine what we here are calling sceptical and affirmative analyses.

A critical/postmodern narratology would, for example, question the stories told to us in the media (Boje, 1999). And it is in the media that stories of

managing so called 'postmodern organizations' under conditions on the edge of chaos, the new Biotech Century and the knowledge worker Virtual corporation continue to proliferate. Dixon (1998: 182), for example, argues that we get socialized by the spectacle of Hollywood cinema, with its 'translucence of coalescing narrative structure, signification systems exhausted through ceaseless recycling, and a star system which cannibalizes all who participate in it.' There is a blurring of the line between martial and storied condition. In the midst of televised baseball, football and soccer games, digitized images not only scroll across the screen, but the game becomes digitized replays, and there are digitized commercial decompositions of the screen to superimpose this or that corporate logo onto the field of play. 'Our connection to the world has become one of images rather than contacts, of surfaces rather than interior motivations' (Dixon, 1998: 185). This way the same commercial sporting space and time can be sold over and over again. 'Thus, viewers of a baseball game in New York might see an advertisement for Miller Beer behind the batter's box; the same viewer in France might see the Citroen corporate logo in the exact same location' (Dixon, 1998: 184). Coke logos just appear on the field of play, and it can be done with such finesse the spectator does not distinguish it from 'real.' The next step here is to digitize and airbrush the rough edging off the dream plays and star players, from archives of instant replay; to hype up the spectacle of continuous consumption (Dixon, 1998: 184).

Finally, we include Currie (1998) who calls for a socio-narratology. He advocates first a critique of synchronic narration by tracing stories of time told in linear sequence. As such, he is striking a middle ground between postmodern and pragmatic narrative. This is embedding the fragmented present in traces of its historical context. And the recognition that there is not one, but many histories (1998: 79). It is a questioning of teleological narratives to trace the differences that have been excluded. Second is Currie's narrative exclusion. Metaphors and models exclude by a tyranny of sameness. Traces of context reveal absences of political importance, of agents bent to ideology. The focus on pure presence is an exclusion of past and future. A fall from natural existence implies that ecology has some metaphysical priority against which the history of capitalism can be seen as a process of progress or deterioration (1998: 83). Best and Kellner (1997) for example look at production and consumption within the ecological limits of Earth's resources. In Part II we explore more middle ground by looking at different applied approaches to narrative, and continue this theme in Part III where more decidedly interdisciplinary approaches are compared and contrasted.

Part II: Applied approaches to narrating organization

In this section we contrast four applied approaches:

1 appreciative inquiry and
2 restorying

and two approaches rooted in pragmatism

3 Emery's Search Conference method for strategic planning and
4 Hopewell's congregation narrative work.

Appreciative inquiry is rooted in social constructionism, restorying is rooted in post-structuralism, Emery's method in Peirce's pragmatic philosophy and Hopewell and Emery in the contextualism as interpreted by Pepper (1942). We will begin with appreciative inquiry and, as we proceed, point out middle ground.

1. Appreciative inquiry is a very different social construction narratology that has an expanding following. It is less eclectic and more applied. For Ludema et al. (1996), Srivastva and Cooperrider (1999) and Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987) appreciative inquiry is thought to achieve positive transformation outcomes by side-stepping negative inquiry and the negative influence of problem stories. Appreciative inquiry puts negative stories aside and moves directly to constructing a new and more positive array of stories through guided acts of participation and inquiry. This is done by asking members to only recall positive stories and move beyond any negative context analysis. They are asked to dream and invent the narrative they want to live. According to the editorial position of *Global Social Innovations* (Wilmot, 1996: 7), a journal of Case Western Reserve's OD programme professors and PhD candidates,

> ... appreciative inquiry is premised on the logic that organizations move in the direction of what [people] study. For example, when groups study human problems and conflicts, they often find both the number and severity of complex and problematic issues has grown. In the same manner, when groups study high human ideals and achievements, such as teamwork, quality or peak experiences, these phenomena, too, tend to flourish in human systems. [Additions ours]

One assumption of the Case Western OD programme is that all forms of negative inquiry are not breathing positive life into organization. This privileges being positive over being critical of narratives within for example a critical theory reading of the political economy. For example, in the GSI publication (Wilmot, 1996: 7), readers are told that GEM consultants work with top management teams in 'appreciative interviews' with each other about their original attractions to the organization, peak experiences, core values and wishes for the organization's future.

At the 1997 Academy of Management meeting, I chaired a session in which the deconstructionists (Boyce, Luhman, Dennehy, Rosile and Barry) debated the appreciative inquiry people (Ludema, Sorensen and Yaeger). Then our discussant, Joanne Martin, challenged us to learn to get along because we have much in common, and pointed out our premise for the session, a debate, was a duality in need of deconstruction. Why not remove the duality? This would mean looking at some of the narrative deconstruction practices in the following section along with the appreciative storytelling.

2. Restorying narratives originate in narrative family therapy practices in Australia and New Zealand (and now around the world) in which the deconstruction approach of White (1989, 1991) and Epston (1989) is prominent. Narrative therapy (White and Epston, 1990) is increasingly being applied to organizational studies (Barry, 1997; Barry and Elmes, 1997). Barry (1997) for